

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

## The future of relocation      State of the Union 2017      Updates on Schengen

The EU's refugee relocation scheme came to an end last September. It was [considered](#) a success by the EU, with European Commission First Vice-President Frans Timmermans saying: "We are on the right track and the results can be seen on the ground". The Visegrad states, however, have long been opposed to the scheme and are currently embroiled in a legal argument with the Commission. Although the concluding of the relocation programme does not mean the EU will stop supporting member states in their efforts to relocate, it [remains](#) to be seen what form this mechanism will take in the future.

Migration featured quite prominently in European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union on 13 September. He emphasised the importance of solidarity between the member states,

and argued the EU should introduce more legal pathways for migration, expand cooperation with African states and step up the pace of returns.

This was taken up by the Commission. On 27 September, it [presented](#) the next steps that will be taken under the European Agenda on Migration. The Commission also advanced its [vision](#) for the future of the Schengen Borders Code. This update follows in the wake of the considerable increase in the number of people migrating to the EU in the past few years, and the ensuing legal confusion at the borders of several member states, with some countries reinstating temporary border controls within the Schengen Area. With the updated Schengen rules the Commission introduces new procedural guarantees, special procedures for persistent serious threats, a prolongation of the maximum time limit for internal border controls to one year with a possibility of extension to two years in cases of persistent serious threats.

# CONTENTS

- 1 • SPECIAL FOCUS | ECJ rules on mandatory relocation
- 3 • POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS | The situation in the Mediterranean . EU cooperation with third countries progresses . Brexit and the status of EU citizens . State of the Union 2017 . German federal elections 2017 . Mid-term review of the Agenda on Migration
- 6 • LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS | Updated Schengen Border Code
- 7 • ECJ CASE LAW & LEGAL ACTIONS | Assisted border crossings . Detention and the functioning of the CEAS
- 8 • A CLOSER LOOK FROM... | FEANTSA
- 10 • FACTS & FIGURES | UNHCR statistics on arrivals . Latest numbers for relocation and resettlement . Recent Reports . Funding Opportunities
- 13 • EU CALENDAR: UPCOMING EVENTS | EU Institutions . Other Events

## SPECIAL FOCUS



## ECJ rules on mandatory relocation

### CEAS

In the wake of the 2015 so-called “migration crisis”, the Council [adopted](#) a decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection, also known as the mandatory relocation scheme. Slovakia and Hungary, together with the Czech Republic and Romania, voted against the adoption of the decision, [stating](#) that their societies could not integrate immigrants coming from Muslim countries. The two member states subsequently brought the issue before the ECJ with the aim of having the relocation scheme annulled.

They based their actions on two claims: first, they stated that the adoption of Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 establishing the relocation scheme was based on procedural errors or arose from the choice of an inappropriate legal basis; second, they asserted that the decision itself was an unsuitable or unnecessary response to the “migrant crisis”. Following the [opinion](#) of Advocate-General Yves Bot, the Court of Justice however [dismissed](#) “the actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary against the provisional mechanism for the mandatory relocation of asylum seekers”. It held that the decision could be adopted in a non-legislative procedure and that the procedure was in fact following the legal basis laid down by the Treaties. Moreover, it argued that the measure was not manifestly inappropriate and could not be judged in retrospect on its efficacy, which was in any case affected by member states’ lack of cooperation.

The reactions to the judgment were mixed. Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos [stated](#) that it was now “time to work in unity and implement solidarity in full”. Yet Slovakian politicians insisted that the quota system did not work and the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade [described](#) the ruling as “outrageous and irresponsible” and stated that “the real battle [was] only just beginning”. Several NGOs and international organisations welcomed the ECJ’s ruling. According to [Caritas Europa](#), the judgment “sends a powerful message on EU’s values of solidarity and responsibility sharing”, while Human Rights Watch [stated](#) that “the ruling should encourage all EU governments to pledge more places and move quickly to relocate asylum seekers”.

The ruling, and its aftermath, are significant when considering the generally contentious nature of the relocation scheme. It can also be pointed out in this context that the Commission is still [involved](#) in infringement proceedings against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for not complying with their relocation obligations. The Commission may still decide to take these proceedings to the next step and refer the member states concerned to the Court of Justice.

The rejection of the relocation programme by the Visegrad countries adds to a number of factors that have led to the scheme generally being perceived as not successful. Amongst these, for instance, the use of (overly) specific [criteria](#) for relocation candidates by some member states. As it stands now, the programme, which ran up to 26 September, has [seen](#) less than 30,000 individuals relocated in two years.

UNHCR has [called](#) for the EU relocation scheme to be continued beyond the two years originally planned. Amnesty International [asked](#) EU countries to “step up and make good on the promises they made” and ECRE similarly [decried](#) the unwillingness of member states to commit to the agreed relocation numbers and called for the relocation scheme to be extended.

In its mid-term review of the European Agenda on Migration, the Commission [stated](#) that it considers the swift relocation of all remaining eligible persons who have arrived to Greece and Italy up until 26 September a priority. At the same time, the Commission held that a reliance on ad hoc measures for relocation could not be continued and called on its co-legislators to instead make progress in the context of the reform of the Dublin Regulation. Accordingly, it is to be expected that there will not be a renewal of the scheme that was previously in place. Rather, discussions on how to organize relocation will likely be continued in the context of the reform of the CEAS.



# The situation in the Central Mediterranean

### CEAS

As discussed in the [July EPIM Policy Update](#), the migration movements in the Central Mediterranean and the role of NGOs in providing Search and Rescue operations remain at the top of the EU agenda. Migration numbers [dropped](#) significantly during the summer of 2017 due to different [factors](#), such as an increase in support for the Libyan Coast Guard, adverse sea conditions and Libyan militias controlling migrant departures. Italy, which received more than 85,000 migrants during the first half of 2017, [pushed](#) for a change in the mandate of the EU's Triton operation and for opening up other European ports to migrant-carrying ships, a proposal that was rejected by various member states. Following the discussions, the Estonian Presidency of the European Council and Justice and Home Affairs ministers [published](#) a statement in which they committed to increasing the Union's engagement with Libya and other third countries, improving the coordination of maritime operations and achieving tangible results in terms of returning irregular migrants.

Further discussions were focused on the proposed code of conduct for NGOs conducting Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean, which was strongly [criticised](#) by some NGOs for [putting](#) lives at risk. The code of conduct entails a number of requirements NGOs would have to fulfil in order to continue operating in the Mediterranean. They would, for example, no longer be allowed to enter Libyan waters to undertake rescues, use lights to signal their position to vessels in distress or transfer rescued people onto other vessels at sea. Five NGOs active in the Mediterranean [refused](#) to sign the code of conduct. A vessel operated by Jugend Rettet e.V. was [seized](#) by Italian authorities for allegedly coordinating with Libyan traffickers and is awaiting trial.

The complexity of the situation in the Mediterranean became apparent as accusations emerged that the Libyan coastguard had [threatened](#) NGO vessels operating in international waters and had [abused](#) migrants once they had been rescued. Additionally, Italy [faced](#) allegations of cooperating with Libyan non-governmental groups to [stop](#) migrant boats from leaving the Libyan coast.

# EU cooperation with third countries progresses

On 6 September, the Commission [published](#) its fifth report on the progress made under the Partnership Framework on Migration, a cooperation established in 2016 between the EU and countries of origin and transit in Africa, namely Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia. The report highlighted the reduction in the number of irregular crossings through the Central Mediterranean Route over the summer season, which it attributes to a good cooperation with Libyan authorities. The Commission also reported progress in establishing migration partnerships with other West African, Asian and North African and Middle Eastern countries.

The cooperation with Libya, which remains the most important transit country for migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean, has been stepped up continuously, in particular with regards to migration management. The EU Trust Fund for Africa [adopted](#) a 46 million euro programme in July to support integrated migration and border management in Libya, implemented by the Italian Ministry of Interior and co-financed by the EU and Italy. Such measures have been subject to [criticism](#), amongst others, for moving the policy focus away from development aid's actual purposes.

Further high-level impetus was given at the Paris Summit on 28 August when the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Spain [met](#) with their counterparts from Chad, Niger and the Libyan UN-backed government, as well as with High Representative Federica Mogherini. The [focus](#) of the meeting was on managing migration, in particular the routes going through Libya and the Mediterranean, but there were also talks on [tackling](#) the root causes of migration and the role development aid can play in that respect.

## Brexit and the status of EU citizens

### Mobile EU citizens

Over the summer, Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU developed slowly. One of the contentious issues on the table concerns the future of the rights enjoyed by EU citizens who live in the UK.

In what was strongly criticised, the UK Home Office mistakenly [sent](#) out deportation letters to EU nationals living in the UK. This has raised questions as to the general approach taken by the UK government towards EU nationals and in particular those that may not be categorized as highly skilled. This was reflected as well in a [Home Office proposal](#) that set out measures to reduce the number of low-skilled migrants from the EU. The proposal, which still needs to be endorsed by ministers and negotiated with EU counterparts, [includes](#) a maximum of a two-year residency for low-skilled EU workers and restrictions on the right to bring family members.

# State of the Union 2017

On 13 September, Commission President Juncker [delivered](#) his 'State of the Union' address. Migration was at the top of the agenda. Amongst others, Juncker called for greater solidarity within and between member states. He furthermore said that Europe would put "an emphasis on returns, solidarity with Africa and opening legal pathways". This link between migration and development aid [drew](#) criticism from civil society, the European Parliament and several African countries.

French President Emmanuel Macron [stressed](#) similar points in a major speech he delivered on 26 September. Like Juncker, he highlighted both the need for more solidarity between member states whilst also calling for more control-oriented measures. However, unlike Juncker, he put greater emphasis on the need to support refugees' integration in host societies.

The Home Affairs ministers, meeting one day after the State of the Union, [concluded](#) that an increased pace of returns was the way forward, alongside stepping up voluntary resettlement efforts, strengthening the concept of a 'safe third country' and closer cooperation with key third countries.

## German federal elections 2017

On 24 September, Germans cast their vote in the federal elections of the German Parliament. Although Angela Merkel will continue to lead the German government in a fourth term as chancellor, her party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as well as the Social Democratic Party (SPD) lost a substantial percentage of the vote, while the far-right populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) made considerable gains. During the run-up to the election, migration and in particular refugees coming to Germany were a much debated [topic](#). Some analysts [consider](#) Merkel's strong stand to keep the borders open during the summer of 2015 as having reduced support for the CDU and as having [pulled](#) voters to the anti-immigration AfD. As Merkel is now facing the difficult task of forming a coalition government, which will likely contain the Green Party and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), it remains to be seen whether she will be able to continue holding on to her leading role on immigration in Europe. The question is especially pertinent in light of Macron's plea (see above) for strengthened EU immigration policies.

## Mid-term review of the Agenda on Migration

CEAS

The mid-term review of the EU's Agenda on Migration featured a number of topical issues. While the update of the Schengen Border Code took centre stage (see below, 'legislative developments'), the Commission also reviewed possible legal pathways for migration. Relocation, and especially its link with solidarity between the member states, continues to be a point of debate (please see our Special Focus). When it comes to resettlement, however, the Commission [recommended](#) a new EU resettlement scheme with at least 50,000 places, as

[called](#) for previously by UNHCR. The new scheme will last until October 2019 and replaces a programme that fulfilled its commitment of resettling a total of 23,000 persons. A regional focus will be put on resettling people from North Africa and the Horn of Africa, in particular from Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Niger and Sudan. At the same time, UNHCR will establish an emergency evacuation mechanism from Libya. The Commission's recommendation on this new EU resettlement scheme should be followed by a common EU [Resettlement Framework](#) which is currently being negotiated.

## LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS



## Updates to the Schengen Borders Code

CEAS

As a consequence of the high numbers of third country nationals entering the territory of the EU in 2015, a number of member states [introduced](#) temporary border controls within the Schengen Area. As stipulated by the Schengen Borders Code, the duration of these instruments were limited to a maximum period of two months in cases requiring immediate action (Article 28) and a maximum of six months in case of foreseeable events (Article 25). Yet, the temporary nature of the internal border controls was contentious as Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway prolonged border checks up to three times, which is the maximum amount allowed for in the Schengen Borders Code. The current and final prolongation will run out in November 2017. After this date, internal border controls can no longer be reinstated on the current grounds: exceptional circumstances resulting from the 2015 migratory flows, deficiencies in Greek external border management or secondary movements resulting from these deficiencies. In this context, the Commission [presented](#) a proposal to update the Schengen Borders Code on 27 September.

The [updates](#) concern Articles 25 to 35 of the Schengen Borders Code. Article 25, the legal basis for the temporary reintroduction of border controls for foreseeable circumstances, can be used when there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security. With the updated rules, the maximum time limit for the reintroduction of border controls would be extended from six months to one year. The Commission would also like to see stronger procedural guarantees, such as a risk assessment, to ensure that border controls are only introduced as a last resort measure. Importantly, the proposals also contain the introduction of Article 27A, which foresees a specific procedure in case the serious threat to

public policy or internal security exceeds one year. In such an event, and where commensurate national measures are taken within the member state's territory to address this threat, the internal temporary border controls could be further prolonged for a maximum length of two years. A leaked "[non-paper](#)" that was drafted by five member states prior to the announced proposal suggests that those states will try to extend the period that is now included in the Commission's updates even further during negotiations.

## ECJ CASE LAW & LEGAL ACTIONS



Immigration Detention . CEAS

### ECJ Cases [C-490/16 AS](#) & [C-646/16 Jafari](#) (Grand Chamber)

26 July 2017

Both cases deal with the functioning of the [Dublin III Regulation \(DRIII\)](#) and were referred by the Slovenian Supreme Court and the Austrian Administrative Court respectively. The cases concern the situation of individuals who were part of a considerable number of migrants crossing the Western Balkans in 2015/2016 and applied for asylum in countries that were not their first point of entry into the EU (Croatia). They were assisted in the border crossings by national authorities. The national courts asked whether under DRIII this facilitated border crossing could be considered as tantamount to the issuance of a visa or whether, instead, it was to be considered as an irregular border crossing.

The Court ruled that an individual moving across borders in the context of an unusually large number of third country nationals to lodge an application for asylum must be regarded as having "irregularly crossed" the borders of any first member state. This is irrespective of the fact that the individual's transit was assisted or tolerated by the respective national authorities. Such a transit, the Court held, is therefore not tantamount to the issuance of a visa under DRIII. The interpretation of the legal framework was not to be affected by the unusually large number of third-country nationals.

Moreover, the Court ruled that any change in the entry conditions to a member state, as was the case here, shall apply only to the territory of the member state in question, not to the whole Schengen territory. Therefore, and due to the crossing being irregular irrespective of any assistance from border officials, the Court held Croatia responsible for processing the asylum applications in these two cases.




## ECJ Case C-18/16 K.

14 September 2017

The case was referred by the District Court, The Hague, and concerned the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of [Directive 2013/33](#), laying down standards for the reception of asylum seekers. The case concerned the situation of Mr K. who had lodged an application for asylum and was detained on the same day due to a risk of absconding and with a view to establishing his identity and nationality. K. lodged an appeal against the decision ordering his detention and claimed that the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of Directive 2013/33 was contrary to Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the right to liberty and security.

The Court ruled that detaining an individual to establish his identity or nationality as provided for by Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of this Directive does not affect the essence of the right to liberty as laid down in Article 6 of the Charter, but indeed meets the objective of ensuring the proper functioning of the Common European Asylum System. The Court found this applicable in particular with regards to the risk of absconding and preventing the possible secondary movements of applicants. It held that the subparagraphs of the Directive struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the applicant's right to liberty and, on the other, the requirements relating to the identification of his nationality.

## A CLOSER LOOK FROM...




## Homelessness among EU citizens living in the UK

### Mobile EU citizens

By Mauro Striano, [FEANTSA](#) (European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless)

Homelessness among mobile EU citizens living in big cities in the UK, as well as in other EU capitals, is not new. In London, we have precise [data](#) that indicates that over the past three years, EU nationals have consistently made up around 40 per cent to 45 per cent of rough sleepers.



In November 2016, the UK adopted the new [European Economic Area \(EEA\) Regulations 2016](#) that came into force on 1 February 2017. These rules, recasting the previous 2006 Regulations, implement at national level the rules provided by Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states. At the same time that the EEA Regulations 2016 came into force, the UK Home Office published a [guide](#) providing instructions on the administrative removal of EU citizens and their family members. According to the guide, rough sleeping may be a misuse of the right to reside, and therefore, EEA nationals or their family members encountered sleeping rough may be subject to administrative removal. These administrative removals can be considered even if the individuals concerned have been in the UK for less than three months and are otherwise exercising Treaty Rights. Moreover, individuals removed for rough sleeping will be subject to re-entry restrictions for twelve months following their removal or voluntary departure.

In FEANTSA's view, the UK Home Office policy, by considering rough sleeping a misuse of the right to reside, is justifying the removal of rough sleepers on the basis of article 35 of Directive 2004/38, which entitles member states to adopt necessary measures in cases of abuses of rights. However, this interpretation of the notion of abuse of rights is not in line with Directive 2004/38 and for this reason FEANTSA filed a complaint before the European Commission against the UK because it is failing to properly implement Article 35 of the Directive at national level.

The latest adopted legislation only gave a hint of legality to a practice of deportation that [goes](#) back to at least to 2010. And of course, it allowed to significantly increase the number of people expelled. As reported by [The Independent](#), data shows that there were 26 per cent more enforced removals of EU nationals in the first three months of 2017 than in the same period last year. Over the last twelve months, almost 5,000 EU citizens have been expelled from the UK.

It is probably too early to expect a reaction from the Commission to the complaint FEANTSA filed last June. However, there is an encouraging development, namely an answer to a Parliamentary question given by Commissioner Jourová, who [pointed](#) out that EU law

“precludes a member state from making the right of residence of an EU citizen in another member state subject to a condition of having a permanent or temporary address” and that “EU citizens who meet the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38/EC have a right of residence, irrespective of whether they are homeless or not”.

## FACTS & FIGURES

**Arrivals to the Greek islands from Turkey are reported to have decreased by 97% since the EU-Turkey Statement became operational.**

Source: **European Commission, September 2017**

## UNHCR statistics on arrivals

### CEAS

Recent data by the UNHCR [reveals](#) the following trends:


- 138,296 sea arrivals have been recorded since the beginning of the year. 106,459 have arrived in Italy, while 20,104 have arrived in Greece and 10,886 have arrived in Spain;
- So far, an estimated 2,658 people have been reported dead or missing in 2017;
- In Italy, the majority of refugees come from Nigeria, Guinea and Bangladesh, while more than a third of refugees arriving in Greece originate from Syria (40,4%). In Spain, the majority of refugees come from Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire.

## Latest numbers for relocation and resettlement

### CEAS

On 6 September, the European Commission [published](#) its 15<sup>th</sup> report on relocation and resettlement:

- As of 4 September, 27,700 relocations have taken place (19,244 from Greece and 8,451 from Italy);
- With regard to resettlement, as of 4 September 17,305 people have fallen under the 20 July 2015 Conclusions, including efforts to resettle Syrians from Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement. Since 4 April 2016, 8,834 Syrians have been resettled from Turkey under this scheme, including 1,028 Syrians since the last reporting period. The remaining number of all pledges now stands at 20,687 Syrians. The total number of people resettled under both EU schemes since their launch is 22,518.



Source: EuropeanMigrationLaw.eu

## Relevant reports

Children and Youth CEAS Immigration Detention

### European Commission: Fifteenth report on relocation and resettlement

With this report, the European Commission [gives](#) an update on the progress made with regards to both channels. The Commission sees a positive trend in relocation with almost all member states, apart from Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, now heeding their pledges. As for resettlement, the Commission observes a shift of resettlements from Jordan and Lebanon to Turkey, after several states with large quotas fulfilled their commitment.

### European Commission: Sixth Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement

Judging the progress made one year after the agreement of the EU-Turkey Statement, the Commission [observes](#) that the number of arrivals from Turkey to the Greek islands have decreased by 97%, while the number of deaths has diminished. Yet, arrivals still outpace the number of returns from the Greek island to Turkey, where the Commission observes increased infrastructural developments in providing facilities for refugees.

### European Commission: Fourth Progress Report on the operationalisation of the European Border and Coast Guard

The Commission [reports](#) that an increased number of officers, now standing at 1,600, are supporting national forces in Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and Spain. At the same time, the Border Agency has completed the vulnerability assessments of Schengen states' external borders and issued corresponding recommendations. The pace of return operations is reported to be quickening by 157% compared to the same period of last year.

### European Commission: Fifth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration

With this progress report (please also see above), the Commission [provides](#) an update on the implementation of the Partnership Framework. It emphasises the results emerging due to measures put in place along the Central Mediterranean Route and through cooperation with third countries in Africa.

## Fundamental Rights Agency: The impact on fundamental rights of the proposed Regulation on the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)

This opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [offers](#) a detailed analysis of how the proposal for an ETIAS regulation would affect fundamental rights compliance, the protection of personal data, equality and non-discrimination, access by law enforcement and fundamental rights, such as the right to asylum and the right to an effective remedy, among other things.

### UNHCR: 'Desperate Journeys'

Covering the first six months of 2017, this UNHCR report [discusses](#) the numbers of migrants arriving through the Eastern, Central and Western Mediterranean Routes to Europe. Moreover, it chronicles the cases of dead and missing persons at sea and along land routes. The report calls for a different and more comprehensive response from states that addresses the root causes of displacement and offers more help to states receiving and hosting refugees.

### Council of Europe: Report on the situation in the Greek hotspots

In this report, the Council of Europe's European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) [analyses](#) the situation in Reception and Identification Centres (RICs), or so-called hotspots, on the Aegean Islands following the entry into force of the European Union-Turkey Statement on 20 March 2016. The CPT comments in particular on the issue of foreign national children deprived of their liberty, adults in immigration detention centres and the ill-treatment of criminal suspects detained by the police.

### Amnesty International: Afghanistan: Forced back to danger: Asylum seekers returned from Europe to Afghanistan

This report [examines](#) the legality of returns to Afghanistan, looking at the human rights situation in the country and at the experiences of returnees. It contrasts data on the number of people being returned from Europe with information on conflict-related casualties and other dangers in Afghanistan, raising a number of questions about the decision-making processes of some European authorities.

## EU Funding opportunities

Children and Youth

CEAS

### Calls for proposals - EU funding

The European Commission has published the following calls for proposals:

- [REC-AG REC Action Grant](#): "Prevent and combat racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance"
  - o call out on 31.05.2017 - Deadline: 07.11.2017
- [REC-AG REC Action Grant](#): "Support national or transnational projects on non-discrimination and Roma integration"
  - o call out on 20.06.2017 – Deadline: 09.11.2017

- [ISFP Action Grant](#): “Call for projects on the Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP) - Campaigns with counter and alternative narrative to radicalisation implemented by civil society organisations”

o call out on 05.10.2017 – Deadline: 11.01.2018

### Other opportunities

EPIM [Call](#) for Research Proposals on the reception and inclusion of children and youth on the move in Europe

## EU CALENDAR: UPCOMING EVENTS


### European Council and Council of the European Union

 12-13 October JHA Council

 19-20 October European Council

 9 November JHA Council

### European Parliament

 9-12 October LIBE Committee Meeting

 19 October LIBE Committee Meeting

 23-26 October EP Plenary


 6 November LIBE Committee Meeting


### Other events







 10 October [The flexible solidarity. How progressive parties handled the migration crisis in Central Europe](#), Foundation for European Progressive Studies

 10 October [Protecting stateless persons from arbitrary detention](#), European Network on Statelessness

 11 October [Migration management cooperation with countries of origin and transit: opportunities and challenges](#), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Brussels

 16-18 October [ECRE Annual General Conference 2017](#), European Council on Refugees and Exiles

 19 October [The External Dimensions of EU Migration Policies: Effectiveness, Fairness and Rule of Law Reconsidered](#), Centre for European Policy Studies

	24 October	<a href="#"><u>Annual Conference: “Moving policy forward, keeping research relevant - strengthening the research - policy dialogue in the fields of migration and integration”</u></a> , EMN National Contact Point Luxembourg
	27 October	<a href="#"><u>Is Schengen fit for purpose? Discussing updates to the Schengen Borders Code</u></a> , EPC, European Policy Centre
	14 November	<a href="#"><u>The Health of Child Refugees &amp; Migrants</u></a> , International Child Health Group and Doctors of the World
	16-17 November	<a href="#"><u>Symposium: “Contesting the Populist Challenge: Beyond ‘Orbanism’ and ‘Trumpism’ and the Normalisation of Exclusion”</u></a> , Malmö University
	17-18 November	<a href="#"><u>Advanced ELENA Course: Legal Avenues for Strengthening International Protection in Europe</u></a> , European Council on Refugees and Exiles
	21 November	<a href="#"><u>Hunger and displacement: views and solutions from the field</u></a> , Action Against Hunger and Danish Refugee Council

This document provides a focused analysis of recent EU level policy-making, legislation and jurisprudence relevant to EPIM’s sub-funds on (1) Immigration detention; (2) Reforms of the Common European Asylum System; (3) Children on the move and (4) Mobile EU citizens’ access to social benefits and covers the period from 7 July 2017 to 5 October 2017. We kindly ask the readers to keep in mind that the present Policy Update is composed of a selection of documents and does not claim to be exhaustive.

Should you, as representatives from EPIM’s Partner Foundations or EPIM-supported organisations, have questions related to the analysis provided in this document or on EU developments in the field of migration and integration in general, you are invited to contact the authors ([k.bambera@epc.eu](mailto:k.bambera@epc.eu), [m.desomer@epc.eu](mailto:m.desomer@epc.eu)). The sole responsibility for the content lies with the author(s) and the content may not necessarily reflect the positions of EPIM, NEF or EPIM’s Partner Foundations.

For more information on EPIM, please visit [www.epim.info](http://www.epim.info)