Recent weeks have witnessed a remarkable change in the mood and action of most EU countries, as they seek to re-orient the Union in a new global context. The uncertain path towards a lasting peace in Ukraine has exposed security risks that extend far beyond Ukraine’s territory. In addition, the EU has learned from the 2008 global, financial recession and the health pandemic that systemic preparedness must underpin the Union’s approach to managing an uncertain era, characterised by crises. The European Commission, together with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has published a Joint Communication on the European Preparedness Union Strategy outlining the parameters for a crisis preparedness framework to help navigate this challenging context.
The strategy adds to the EU’s unfolding ‘security’ architecture. However, weaknesses in the EU27’s collective vision, appetite and governance systems cast doubt on the extent to which a genuine ‘Preparedness Union’ – that is both bold and comprehensive – can be fully mobilised.
In particular, the EU’s multi-level governance challenges are laid bare in the new Communication. The actions outlined present a significant ‘stress test’ for the EU in determining whether our governance systems are up to the challenge of generating a Union-wide response to crisis preparedness and management. Failure to deliver this would undermine our global standing, expose security gaps and distance EU citizens from the complexity and demands of the EU’s security agenda.
The EU must overcome these deficits. It must strengthen governance and optimise the relevance of the Preparedness Union by:
1) upgrading EU policy governance and coordination – the European Commissionmust integrate all EU security-related policy and investment priorities to generate a comprehensive security architecture;
2) strengthening EU multi-level governance – the role of regions as critical players in the EU’s comprehensive security architecture must be embedded in its preparedness direction.
The Union’s crisis preparedness: what is at stake?
The need to upgrade the EU’s approach to crisis management is at the core of the new Preparedness Union direction. It echoes the vision outlined in the Niinistö Report and mentions the term ‘security’ 44 times without limiting it to a ‘hard defence’ perspective. It considers energy, food, climate and health security as integral to crisis preparedness. This signals a departure from the EU’s incremental and piecemeal security approach (e.g. in economic and defence-related security) where an absence of collective, EU27 commitment has served to fragment security-oriented policy, action and investments.
The Preparedness Communication outlines the need for an upgrade to the instruments and coordination efforts that underpin EU crisis preparedness. It notes that current governance structures represent alignment weaknesses across the EU crisis preparedness spectrum. Yet, it falls short in highlighting how this should be addressed. Furthermore, even since the launch of the Preparedness Communication, there is new, back-sliding into fragmented, EU policy actions. The mid-term review of Cohesion Policy has proposed a long wish-list of themes that could qualify for Cohesion re-financing, many of which have a clear preparedness angle (including climate mitigation and water resilience measures). Scattered throughout the document, this represents a missed opportunity to position Cohesion reprogramming as part of our comprehensive preparedness and security needs.
Delivery of the Union’s preparedness agenda will require a wholesale, EU policy governance upgrade to re-position and coordinate the entire security architecture. This is needed precisely because crisis preparedness and management cuts across the whole panoply of our security interests. Catalysing action to deliver the ‘paradigm shift’ noted in the Joint Communication coincides with the timing of the EU’s radical policy redesign agenda. The European Commission’s Communication on the post-2027 EU budget outlines new demands for EU policy and investment efficiency, underpinned by simplification, reduced bureaucracy and policy and investment alignment. The time is therefore ripe to position comprehensive security at the core of this direction, setting out the policy, governance and investment pathway for delivery. Indeed, the post-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework must drive the direction for the EU’s security era. It will only make sense to citizens when it is packaged and communicated as a comprehensive agenda. This is especially necessary for citizens in EU countries and geographies who perceive the security threat less acutely. The strength of the Security and Defence Union depends on its relevance and support across all EU territories and citizens.
The overlooked regional dimension to preparedness and security
Ironically, the Joint Communication on the Preparedness Union calls for improved governance at a time when the EU risks weakening its multi-level governance system. The recent Communication on the future budget presented a vision for three pillars under which a ‘Single National Plans’ pillar would deliver Cohesion, Resilience and Values. This assumes a stronger, centralised, role for member states that risks displacing the regions in the post-2027 period. This architecture presents a clear contradiction to the direction set out in the Preparedness Union Strategy, which foresees a very strong local/regional role in delivering a Union-wide preparedness response. The Communication highlights:
• Inequality as a risk factor for preparedness – the detailed knowledge of the EU’s most vulnerable groups comes from the regional level, who have clear insights into – and direct lines of support for – those with the least resilience to manage in times of crisis.
• The role of civilian support for the continuous operation of state and society – this must be optimised at the local level where place-based expertise is indispensable.
• The need for a comprehensive preparedness and crisis management overview including water, energy, telecommunications and healthcare – a ‘top-down’ diagnosis (without the ‘bottom-up’ local intelligence and coordinated mobilisation of the delivery system) would be partial and incomplete, potentially failing to harness local innovation, knowledge and practice in areas such as food security and cybersecurity.
• Crisis communication systems must reach all people under all circumstances – systemic connections with all EU territories can only be realised through local/national coordination efforts. Indeed, in federally organised member states this is a requirement.
• Our understanding of ‘dual-use’ is being stretched and deepened to respond to our security needs – regional economies must be fully engaged in this policy and investment redesign effort, harnessing their innovation ecosystems to a new dual-use era of security-related research, mobility, climate and infrastructure.
The voice of regional and local authorities has perhaps never been needed more in the EU’s history. Defining our preparedness needs through a comprehensive security and resilience lens means translating and connecting actions through all levels of strengthened EU governance. Dislocating regions from this effort comes with significant risks in maximising military and civilian readiness.
Championing EU governance: preparing all places for ‘preparedness’
The Preparedness Union Strategy offers an important opportunity to review and upgrade the design of the proposed Single National Plans for the post-2027 period, ensuring the voice and role of regions is undiminished in building the EU’s future comprehensive security architecture. Addressing this head-on is needed if the vision for the Preparedness Union – and maximising the comprehensive security needs of EU citizens – stands any chance of success.
The publication of the Preparedness Union Strategy brings the EU one step closer to realising a comprehensive security direction. However, there are many obstacles to achieving this, not least the absence of a unanimous appetite and commitment among the EU27 to face up to the significance of the challenges that lie ahead and the political leadership this requires. In the meantime, the European Commission must push for, and champion, improved governance – both to maximise the impact of a comprehensive security policy direction and to set out the conditions to fully engage and mobilise the regional level of the EU multi-level governance system.
Alison Hunter is Senior Adviser on regional policy, innovation and industrial growth at the EPC.
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.