Moldova will hold presidential elections and a referendum on EU membership on 20 October, marking the most significant votes since the country’s independence in 1991. The outcome will shape the country’s future, geostrategic direction. Recent polling suggests strong voter enthusiasm, and trust in the current President, Maia Sandu, and strong support for joining the EU. However, the outcome is far from certain, with a risk of Russian interference and disruption of the votes.
For decades, Moldova has swung between pro-European and pro-Russian influences. However, in recent years, the EU and Chișinău have deepened relations. Moldova’s 2014 Association Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU significantly strengthened relations while spurring crucial reform in the country. Moldova also secured visa liberalisation with the EU in the same year. While many Moldovans already have Romanian passports, this step has further strengthened ties at the societal level.
Yet, the fact that EU membership was never on the table left Moldova in a hostile geopolitical grey environment. Russia used its vast hybrid warfare toolbox and proxies to push back against the deepening of ties with the EU, including through disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and illegal political financing.
Kremlin backed political parties, such as the now-banned party of oligarch Ihor Shor (it was declared unconstitutional by Moldova’s Constitutional Court), the Kremlin-allied breakaway republic of Transnistria, where Russia has a military base, and the Russian-speaking autonomous region of Gagauzia, have been important vessels spreading Russian propaganda and creating instability. Furthermore, shutting down Russian-backed parties frequently results in the creation of new ones.
The impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has had a profound impact on neighbour Moldova. Beyond the security crisis with multiple violations of its airspace by Russian missiles, with debris landing on its territory, Chișinău has also faced an energy crisis. Additionally, skyrocketing inflation has had a devasting impact on the already impoverished population. The war triggered an immediate shift in Moldova-Russia relations. Chișinău threw its support behind Kyiv and froze official ties with Russia. No meetings have taken place at a bilateral level or in regional groupings since. Furthermore, many politicians who were once friendly with the Kremlin, now want to avoid being labelled pro-Russian. The exception to his is Shor, who has been openly vote-buying.
Russia’s war of aggression was a huge wake-up call for EU leaders, who finally realised that their security is inextricably linked to that of their eastern neighbours, recognising the foolhardiness of leaving these states in a grey zone. After years of dormancy, enlargement returned to the EU’s agenda as a geopolitical imperative. When Ukraine submitted its application for EU membership on 28 February 2022, Moldova quickly followed. Accession negotiations were officially opened on 24 June 2004, following Chișinău meeting a set of priorities. Both the EU and a number of EU member states have been working in support of Moldova reducing its vulnerabilities to Russian interference, and have been shepherding a clear EU membership path. However, the results of the Presidential election or referendum risk delaying or even derailing Moldova’s EU journey.
Moldova’s date with destiny
The first round of the Presidential vote will take place on 20 October. If none of the 11 candidates win over 50% of the vote, there will be a runoff on 3 November. Incumbent President, Maia Sandu, who represents the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), currently has a significant lead in the polls with some 36.1% support. Moving ahead with EU membership is the cornerstone of her campaign and is particularly popular with the younger generation and the middle class.
Alexandr Stoianoglo, a former prosecutor general, is her main challenger, polling around 10-11% and has also declared European integration a priority. While he also holds that relations with Russia should be pragmatic and mutually beneficial. Although he is a political newbie, this could make him a bigger challenge if Sandu runs off against him in a second round. Those unhappy with her leadership may consolidate around him. His vote base will include many of the older generation,people from rural areas and those who feel they have become poorer in recent times. This include A significant part of the Russian-speaking population.
Stoianoglo is backed by the pro-Russian Party of Socialists, whose leader, ex-president Igor Dodon, is the nation’s most popular opposition politician. It seems Dodon chose not to run to open the way for Stoianoglo. Sandu has publicly declared his candidature as a Kremlin plot to have thieves return to Moldova. Thus, the election will be a litmus test for assessing the level of Russian support in the country.
Implications of the result
A double victory for the country’s pro-western forces in the presidential election as well as the referendum would consolidate Moldova’s western trajectory and EU membership goal. However, much depends on the outcome of the constitutional referendum, which aims to enshrine EU membership as a strategic goal in the constitution. The vote is a test of the national will and commitment to a future in the EU.
Currently , the pro-European camp appears to be heading for victory, with polls indicating that around 53% of citizens intend to support the constitutional change. However, this does not include the potential vote of the approximately one million Moldovans living abroad as well as the some 300.000 citizens residing in Transnistria. In the past, there has been a low turnout of those residing in Transnistria as they need to travel to Moldova. However, there has been an unexpectedly high number of registrations from Russia, which has raised concerns over potential undue influence on these voters.
Russian interference is a major threat to both the integrity of the referendum and presidential elections. In June 2024 the UK, the US and Canada issued a statement flagging Russian efforts to undermine the elections. Moscow is throwing everything it has into this fight. Beyond the well-known and still impactful narrative that the EU will destroy Moldova’s traditional values, artificial intelligence, including deep fakes, is increasingly used by the Kremlin. One fake video in which Sandu was seen banning people from drinking a popular berry-infused tea due to EU regulations, caused a national outcry.
Still, Moldova has gained important experience countering Russian hybrid warfare and is much better equipped to push back, and so are Chișinău partners. The government recently blocked numerous Telegram channels and chatbots calling on voters to cast "no" ballots in the referendum. This includes Shors Telegram accounts. In addition, US tech giant Meta recently removed a network of group accounts from Facebook and Instagram targeting Russian-speakers in Moldova.
Steps to increase the country’s cyber and information security through the establishment of a robust cyber security infrastructure have also been taken. During the 2023 local Moldovan elections, there were large-scale cyber-attacks. Such incidents risk the election results being called into question.
Civil society organisations and independent media are also playing a crucial role in strengthening the country’s resilience, security and stability at national and local levels. Still, the recent European Parliament Resolution urging Russia to respect Moldova’s independence and cease political interference, underscores the magnitude of the challenges the country faces. The resolution highlights alleged “voter bribery, cyber operations and information warfare”, involving “a plethora of malicious actors, including the state-funded RT network.
With the stakes so high, the upcoming elections and accompanying referendum were always going to be a battle for Moldova’s future. The results will either consolidate Chișinău’s EU membership path or keep Moldova in a grey zone. Either result will have major consequences not only for Moldova but also for the EU’s and regional security and stability.
Amanda Paul is a Senior Policy Analyst and Deputy Head of the Europe in the World Programme at the EPC.
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